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THE "WARREN COURT" AND THE ANTITRUST 
LAWS: OF ECONOMICS, POPULISM, 
AND CYNICISM 
Thomas E. Kauper"' 
N o one could quarrel with the simple assertion that the so-called "Warren Court" has had a significant, if indeed not 
extraordinary, impact on the development of the antitrust laws. It 
could hardly have been otherwise. The fifteen years since 1953 
represent virtually one-fourth of the total history of the Clayton 
and Federal Trade Commission Acts,1 and one fifth of the time 
which has elapsed since passage of the Sherman Act.2 Every Su-
preme Court decision under the 1950 amendments to section 7 
of the Clayton Act, 3 the so-called antimerger law, has come after 
the accession of Chief Justice Warren to the bench. 
Moreover, these fifteen years have been unlike any other con-
secutive fifteen years in the history of antitrust enforcement. Gov-
ernment and the public have remained committed to antitrust 
concepts-to a firm belief in the efficacy of the free market as a 
regulator of business behavior.4 It has not always been so. Histor-
ically, there has been a questioning of the assumptions underlying 
antitrust and correlative lack of enforcement during periods of 
grave economic or military crisis.5 But no such crises have existed 
since 1953.6 The enforcement agencies remained reasonably well-
funded and active during this peFk>d. Private litigants have 
brought more treble damage actions, with a higher degree of suc-
cess, than ever before. An expanding economy, characterized by 
extraordinary technological development, has created an array of 
• Associate Professor of Law, University of Michigan. A.B. 1957, J.D. 1960, Univer-
sity of Michigan.-Ed. 
I. Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-.2i (1964); Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 V.S.C. 
§§ 41-58 (1964). 
2. 15 u.s.c. §§ 1-7 (1964). 
3. 15 u.s.c. § 18 (1964). 
4. There are of course those who do not share this belief. See, e.g., J. GALBRAITH, 
THE NEW lNDt:STRIAL STATE (196i). 
5. The NRA codes of the early thirties, and the use of wage and price controls and 
rationing of consumer goods during W'orld ,var II are but two ilh1strations of this 
phenomenon. 
6. The government's need to meet the demands of the Vietnam war and its desire 
to curb inflationary pressures have led to some deviations from market self-regulation, 
as demonstrated by the periodic confrontations between the White House and the 
steel industry over proposed price increases, and the government's attempts to secure 
voluntary compliance with its wage and price guidelines. But there has not been an 
extended, considered departure from basic antitrust concepts. 
[325] 
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new problems. In such circumstances, it would be astonishing if 
the Court, with its peculiar responsibility for formulation of anti-
trust doctrine,7 had not contributed much to its development. 
Many of the Court's post-1953 antitrust decisions are simply 
reaffirmations of pre-existing doctrine. This has been particularly 
true of cases involving conspiratorial conduct, where the Court 
has continued zealously to condemn price-fixing, horizontal market 
division, and group boycotts as per se violations of section I of 
the Sherman Act. 8 But in other areas, new standards reflecting 
a strong enforcement philosophy have been applied. The most 
striking, most publicized, and most criticized decisions have been 
the extended series of decisions holding mergers in violation of 
section 7 of the Clayton Act. Beginning with the Brown Shoe 
case,0 which perhaps remains the most radical of the antimerger 
rulings, the Court has moved to a virtual per se prohibition of 
horizontal mergers between firms with substantial market shares.10 
In dealing with conglomerate acquisitions, where structural effects 
cannot normally be measured by reference to market shares or 
changes in concentration ratios, the Court has proceeded with 
greater caution, but violations have been found in each case.11 
Of at least equal significance has been the Court's treatment 
of a wide variety of vertical restraints. The Court has extended 
the long-standing ruling that vertical price-fixing is a per se vio-
lation of section l of the Sherman Act by closing a number of 
avenues previously used, with judicial blessing, to achieve the 
same end. The Colgate12 doctrine-which in effect permitted a 
seller to implement a,_ program of resale price maintenance by re-
fusing to deal with buyers who failed to comply with the seller's 
pre-announced policy-has been severely curtailed, although it is 
too much to assert that it has been completely overruled. The 
Court's expansion of vertical conspiracy doctrine, together with 
its unwillingness to countenance reliance on Colgate if the 
7. Under the Expediting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 29 (1964), appeals in civil antitrust actions 
brought by the Department of Justice must be taken directly to the Supreme Court. 
8. See, e.g., United States v. Sealy. Inc., 288 U.S. 350 (1967); Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway· 
Hale Stores, l!J.c., 359 U.S. 207 (1959). 
9. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962). 
10. See, e.g., United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546 (1966); United States 
v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 
377 U.S. 271 (1964); United States v. Philadelphia Natl. Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963). Sec 
also United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964). 
11. FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965); FTC v. Procter &: Camble 
Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967). The merger condemned in United States v. El Paso Natural 
Gas Co., .376 U.S. 651 (1964), is perhaps best described as a market extension con• 
glomerate. 
12. United States v. Colgate &: Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919). 
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seller goes in any way beyond a naked refusal to deal, makes the 
immunized path a narrow one indeed.13 The immunity once con-
ferred 11pon bona fide consignment relationships, where the seller 
dictated the price at which its agent sold, has met a similar fate. 
At least in those cases where a seller operates through a sizeable 
distribution network, such arrangements have been brought within 
the per se vertical price fixing rule.14 Finally, the Com-t's hostility 
toward vertical price-fixing is manifest in its narrow construction 
of the McGuire Amendment,15 which legislatively permits some 
sellers operating in so-called fair trade states to engage in resale 
price maintenance.16 
Other vertical restrictions have been similarly treated. Tie-ins 
and compulsory package arrangements are ru>w virtually per se 
illegal.17 After some initial hesitation in White 1.11otor,18 the Court 
has apparently held that contractual restraints upon the ability of a 
purchasing dealer to resell the manufacturer's. product where and 
to whom the dealer pleases are per se violations of the Sherman 
Act, although in a curious twist the Court has not applied a per 
se rule where such restrictions are placed upon a manufacturer's 
agents.19 Indeed, virtually the only vertical arrangement between 
seller and purchaser other than outright merger to come before 
the Court during this period and escape per se or near per se con-
demnation has been the simple requirements contract.20 
There have been other significant developments. Apparent con-
flicts between the patent and antitrust laws have been r·esolved 
in favor of the latter.21 The patent misuse doctrine has been ex-
tended.22 ·with its holding that a firm may violate the Sherman 
Act through the exercise of a patent procured through active 
13. For examples of decisions which have narrowed the Colgate doctrine, see Al-
brecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968); United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 
U.S. 29 (1960). Cf. United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966). 
14. Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964). But cf. United States v. Arnold, 
Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967). 
15. 15 u.s.c. § 45 (1964). 
16. S1ce United States v. :'>IcKesson & Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S. 305 (1956). 
17. United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962); Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. 
United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958). 
18. White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963). 
19. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967). But see Albrecht v. 
Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 154 (1968) (concurring opinion). 
20. Tampa Elec. C-0. v. Na:;hville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961). The C-Ourt has 
not passed upon the validity of the simple exclusive franchise, i.e., a promise by the 
sellt:r not to sell to others in the franchisee's area. Such an arrangement was present in 
White Molar, but was not attacked by the government. 
21. See United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174 (1963). 
22. Brulotte v. Thys Co .• 3i9 U.S. 29 (1964). 
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fraud, the Court has brought the antitrust laws directly into the 
Patent Office itself.23 
On still another front, the Court's fundamental faith in the 
efficacy of antitrust has been reflected in its continuing rejection 
of arguments for industry-wide exemption from the antitrust laws. 
Exempting legislation has been narrowly construed, except in the 
case of labor activities.24 Doubts about the applicability of antitrust 
to professional sports other than baseball have been removed.25 In a 
number of regulated industries, the fact of regulation has been held 
insufficient grounds for immunization from the antitrust laws.26 
Finally, special note should be taken of the Court's willing-
ness to defer to the discretion of the Federal Trade Commission, 
which surely had not been accustomed to such favored treatment . 
..Despite a marked propensity for disagreeing with district court 
findings, the Court has shown little inclination to go behind the 
findings of the Commission. But deference to the Commission has 
not been limited to its factual determinations alone. In a series 
of decisions culminating in FTC v. Brown Shoe Co.,27 the Court 
has recognized to an unprecedented extent a broad authority in 
the Commission to declare conduct conflicting with the policies 
of the Sherman and Clayton Acts unlawful without proof of actual 
or probable anticompetitive effects. So far as the Supreme Court 
is concerned, the Commission now stands at its high water mark. 
The role played by Chief Justice Warren in these developments 
has not been highly visible. He has authored few Court opinions 
in leading antitrust cases, and has written even fewer dissents. 
(The latter is in part because he has generally been with the major-
ity.) Best knmvn of his opinions for the Court is the enigmatic 
opinion in the Brown Shoe merger case.28 The result-holdin_g un-
lawful the acquisition of a retailer with at most 1.2 per cent of 
national retail shoe sales by a manufacturer producing some 4 
23. Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965). 
24. E.g., Case-Swayne Co. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 389 U.S. 384 (1967), rehearing 
denied, 390 U.S. 930 (1968); Camatio11 Co. v. Pacific Westbound Conference, 383 U.S. 
213 (1966); Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers Assn. v. United States, 362 U.S. 458 
(1960), But see Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. Winckler &: Smith Citrus Prods. Co., 370 U.S. 
19 (1962). 
25. Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957); United States v. 
International Boxing Club, Inc., 348 U.S. 236 (1955). 
26. E.g., United States v. Philadelphia Natl Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963); Silver v. 
New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341 (1963). See California v. FPC, 369 U.S. 482 
(1962). 
27. 384 U.S. 316 (1966). See also Atlantic Ref. Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357, re• 
hearing denied, 382 U.S. 873 (1965). 
28. 370 U.S. 294 (1962). The best-known dissent by the Chief Justice is in the 
DuPont Cellophane case. United States v. E. I. duPont de ·Nemours &: Co., !151 U.S. 
377, 414 (1956). 
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per cent of national footwear-is startling indeed. But the out-
come is obscured by an opinion which, seemingly by design, con-
tains something for everyone. The call for a broad economic in-
quiry, the recognition of the failing-company doctrine, and several 
other statements, suggested moderation in the Court's approach. 
At the same time, the Court expressed fears about increasing 
concentration, emphasized the need for halting merger trends in 
their "incipiency," and stressed the desirability of protecting small 
business. Each of these emphases gave comfort to those calling 
for a strict antimerger policy and, as it turned out, set the 
tenor for decisions which followed. The Brown Shoe opinion is 
perhaps less reflective of the Chief Justice's substantive views than 
of his capacity as a judicial statesman. Since Brown Shoe was the 
first major decision under the amended se~tion 7, its widespread 
acceptance by the bar and the business community was essential 
to the antimerger movement. In achieving this acceptance, it seems 
to me, the Chief Justice succeeded. But like all successes, this one 
had its price. In later cases, critics would accuse the Court of 
departing from the moderate standards of Brown Shoe. 
The Chief Justice has had a considerable impact simply as 
one of nine voting members of the Court. His voting record, in 
terms of result, is remarkably consistent: he has voted "for liability" 
more than any other member of the Court during his fifteen year 
tenure.29 But any suggestion that the Chief Justice has had an im-
pact beyond the weight of his vote would be sheer speculation at 
this point. It seems more likely that he has followed the views of 
others, particularly Justices Black and Douglas, than that they 
have followed him. The antitrust work of the Warren Court, like 
its work in other area~,. is the work of a Court over which a given 
Chief Justice has happened to preside. The doctrines developed 
by the majority may be identified with him, for he has generally 
been part of the majority, but he is neither solely nor, apparently, 
primarily responsible for them. 
Substantively, the antitrust opinions of the Warren Court have 
reflected a peculiar blend of modern economic theory and Pop-
ulism. The increasing use of economic theory as -a basis for, or 
at least an explanation of, decisions in merger cases has been part-
:cularly apparent; opinions in merger cases now speak the lan-
?;Uage and rely upon the writings of economists. The antitrust 
lawyer in a merger case finds himself talking about concentration 
ratios, barriers to entry, elasticity of supply and demand, and po-
29. See Arnold, The Supreme Court and the Antitrust Laws 1953-1967, 34 A.B.A. 
ANTITRUST L.J. 2, 7 (1967). 
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tential competition. The Court's fear of increased concentration, 
and the rules enunciated to prevent it, do reflect increasing so-
phistication in the use of oligopoly theory.30 Yet even here the Court 
has continued on occasion to express a concern for particular com-
petitors, small businesses, and consumer choice-a concern beyond 
that justified by economic theory. 
Continued reliance on the knowledge of economists is essential 
to the antitrust practitioner, and lawyers who continually assert 
that they cannot understand econom~cs or economists must go 
back and learn. It is foolhardy to ignore an extremely significant 
part of human knowledge because it seems difficult to compre-
hend. But, while the Court's recognition of such knowledge is a 
healthy development in the abstract, it also presents a number 
of questions. First, and most obvious, is whether the Court has 
simply used economic doctrine to support decisions arrived at 
upon other grounds. This is not an easy question to answer. There 
is often no single applicable economic theory; economists disagree 
about the results in particular cases just as frequently as lawyers 
do. Hence, as a necessary by-product of any reliance on economic 
doctrine, the Court has recited the views of some economists in 
preference to the views of others. In its first section 7 cases, and 
particularly in the Philadelphia Bank case, the Court did rely upon 
oligopoly theory as a basis for formulating broad general rules to 
deal ·with the effects of increased concentration in particular 
markets. 31 The rules created could be justified by reference to the 
theory relied upon. But the Court has not purported to rest its deci-
sion in every case upon the dictates of -such economic analysis. 
Subsequent cases have interjected other values; for example, the em-
phasis on the protection of small business as an end in itself in 
the Brown Shoe32 and Von's Grocery33 cases. At other times, the 
Court has stressed the need for simple rules which can be under-
stood and easily applied. These cases represent less a misuse of 
economic doctrine than an unwillingness to make results de-
pendent upon it. One can quarrel with such .divergence from the 
dict_ates of strict economic reasoning; perhaps the teachings of 
economic theory should be · conclusive. But this is a question to 
be confronted head on, and not by accusing the Court of mis-
using doctrine it has not purported to apply. 
30. See generally Brodley, Oligopoly Power Under the Slzerman and Cla)'ton Acts-
From Economic Theory to Legal Policy, 19 STAN. L. REV. 285 (1967). 
31. United States v. Philadelphia Natl. Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963). See also United 
States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964); United States v. Aluminum Co, of 
America, 377 U.S. 271 (1964). 
32. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962). 
!13. United States v. Von's Grocery Co., !184 U.S. 270 (1966). 
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If there has been a real abuse of economic analysis-a conscious 
or unconscious manipulation of economic concepts to fit an ap-
parently pre-ordained result-it has been in the process of market 
definition. More will be said of this subsequently. But whatever 
the defects in the Court's process of market definition, the blame 
cannot be placed entirely with the Justices. Economists have labored 
to develop theories which are ultimately dependent upon market 
definition, but they have furnished far less guidance in outlining 
the definitional process itself.3i 
The use of economic analysis by the Court raises a number 
of additional questions: How is the Court to "know" such theory? 
Is it, or can it be, sufficiently sophisticated in economic principles 
to apply them at all? Half a theory, when the balance is not com-
prehended, may be more dangerous than none at all. Moreover, 
the interjection of noneconomic values into a structured system 
of economic analysis, unless done with great skill, may make the 
analysis meaningless. And economic theory must be applied con-
sistently; it cannot be used today· and forgotten tomorrow. Other-
wise distortions will appear. 
Few of these questions arise in connection with the Court's 
opinions involving vertical restraints; here economic theory is 
conspicuous by its absence. The growing body of economic knowl-
edge concerning the effects of vertical integration, resale price 
maintenance, territorial and other restrictions on distributors, and 
tying arrangements have been virtually ignored.35 The Court has 
generally dealt with such vertical restraints in a manner more 
familiar to common-law lawyers. Decisions in this area often rest 
upon grounds whose antecedents trace far back into the history 
of the antitrust laws. TJ:ie Court's per se condemnation of the ter-
ritorial and customer restrictions imposed by Arnold Schwinn & Co. 
upon its purchaser-dealers rested on the common-law rule against 
restraints on alienation,36 employed as far back as the Dr. Miles 
:Medical case37 in connection with vertical price-fixing. Other es-
sentially vertical restraints have been held unlawful through ex-
panded concepts of vertical conspiracy, thereby obviating, at least 
34. One notable exception is Lozowick, Steiner, &: Miller, Law and Quantitative 
Multivariate Analysis: An Encounter, 66 MICH. L. REv. 1641 (1968). See generally 
Steiner, :Markets and Industries, in 9 !NTER.'IATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL 
SCIENCES 575 (1968). 
35. See, e.g., Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept:_Price Fixing and 
Market Division II, 75 YALE LJ. 3i3 (1966); Bowman, Tying Arrangements and the 
Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19 (1957); Burstein, A Theory of Full-Line Forcing, 55 
Nw. U. L. REv. 62 (1960). These works have a similar, highly controversial outlook, and 
I do not mean to suggest that the courts should necessarily adopt- their analysis. But 
they should at least be confronted. 
86. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn &: Co., 888 U.S. 365, 377-79 (1967). 
87. Dr. Mil,,, M"'1iCY. ro .,. J"'.m D. !.'~ & eons Co., 220 U.S. 87!! (191 I). 
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in the Court's judgment, any necessity for determining the actual 
impact of the restraint and the legality of similar restraints uni-
laterally imposed.38 The legality of vertical acquisitions, require-
ments contracts, and~ to a lesser degree, tying arrangements, 
depends in large measure upon the percentage of the market fore-
closed to competitors of the seller by the arrangement.39 This 
standard was further simplified by the assumption in Brown Shoe 
that competitors of the seller would as the result of a vertical 
acquisition necessarily be foreclosed from all sales to the acquired 
customer. The mere fact of substantial foreclosure is not always 
conclusive of illegality. Economies created by the arrangement 
may be taken into account.40 New firms, or firms with other pec-
uliar problems, may be treated differently. But substantial fore-
closure, rather than an increase in concentration or horizontal 
market power, has become the measure of the injury to competi-
tion called for by the Clayton Act. 
Why this should be so has not been made altogether clear. One 
cannot assume that substantial foreclosure necessarily reflects or 
results in increased concentration or market power at the seller 
level. Foreclosure through various forms of vertical integration 
may create unduly high barriers to entry, but this is not so in 
every case and may not be particularly relevant if the industry 
is highly competitive anyway. Some of these arrangements, partic-
ularly tie-ins, may be used by a seller with market power to 
obtain additional monopoly profit, but such an effect can hardly 
be measured by reference. to de)¥.ee of market foreclosure. Appar-
ently uncertain about the effect of such vertical arrangements upon 
concentration in the marKet ana not confident that in all cases 
such effects can be determined on a case-by-case basis, the Court 
has proceeded with a method of analysis placing primary emphasis 
on equality of opportunity, free access to markets by competing 
sellers, and complete freedom oCc:hoice by -buyers. If it can be 
proved that the challenged practice is likely to increase concentra-
tion or create high barriers to entry, so much the better. But in any 
event, the. practice may be condemned as an unwarranted limitation 
on buyer and/or seller opportunities. 
Preservation of free and unrestricted markets comprised of 
a large number of buyers and sellers is of course perfectly con-
sistent with the economic goal of workable competition. But the 
38. See United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S, 127 (1966). 
39. Compare Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962) (vertical merger) 
with United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962) (tying arrangement) and Tampa 
Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961) (requirements contract). 
40. Compare Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962), with Tampa 
Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. !!20 (1961). 
December 1968] The Antitrust Cases 333 
Court has often seemed less concerned with the economically nec-
essary level of rivalry within the market than with what may be 
described as the "rights" of the individual firms which comprise 
the market: their independence and right to be treated as other 
firms are treated have become values to be protected as ends in 
themselves. This necessarily shifts the focus away from the market 
to the allegedly injured firm or group of firms. 
The preoccupation in Von's Grocery,41 a horizontal merger 
case, with the dual need to preserve a large number of competitors 
and to protect small business indicates that such concerns have 
found expression in cases other than those involving vertical re-
straints. But it is in cases challenging vertical restraints that these 
themes have been most persistent and most determinative of the 
outcome. The "foreclosure" standard so frequently used in vertical 
restraint cases partially reflects this emphasis on the preservation 
of numerous competitors and protection of small businessmen. 
This concern is also evident, in a somewhat different dimen-
sion, in the Court's frequent assertions that unlawful restraints 
have been "imposed" on buyers (usually distributors) as the re-
sult of inequality of bargaining power between buyer and seller. 
One of the commonly stated vices of tying arrangements is that 
they "coerce" the buyer into purchasing a product he does not 
want.42 In Brown Shoe, the Court noted that the acquired firm 
would be "forced" to buy Brmvn's shoes.43 Similar findings of 
"coercion," "compulsion," or other economic pressure appear reg-
ularly in cases involving contractual arrangements between man-
ufacturers and distributors with respect to prices, territories, 
and customers. This suggests that it is the manner in which the 
restraint is imposed, rather than the effect of the arrangement 
upon the market, which is the reason for its condemnation.44 "Co-
ercion" is a slippery concept, and the Court has used the word 
rather loosely. In some cases, it appears to mean that the buyer 
is peculiarly dependent upon a given seller as a source of supply 
and may simply be a shorthand expression denoting market power 
in the seller. But at other times, the word seems to mean little 
more than the seller is somehow "bigger" than the buyer, a condi-
tion which generally prevails when the buyer is an independent 
distributor. However unrealistically, th~ distributor is viewed as 
an independent economic unit whose very independence is itself 
41. United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966). 
42. See, e.g., United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 48 n.6 (1962). 
43. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 332 (1962). 
44. Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13, 21 (1964); United States v. Parke, Davis 
&: Co., 362 U.S. 29, 42 (1960). Cf. Atlantic Ref. Co. v. ITC, 381 U.S. 357, 368 (1964). 
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a value to be protected. The antitrust laws have become the vehicle 
for redressing the imbalance of bargaining power which threatens 
the exercise of his independent judgment. 
The Court's increasing emphasis on the preservation of ·equal 
individual opportunity and on uncoerced, fully independent deci-
sion-making can hardly be said to be alien to the history and tra-
dition of the antitrust laws. The values reflected are more social 
and political than economic, but this is in itself no basis for con-
demnation of the Court, particularly at a time when similar 
values have become increasingly important in other areas. Equal-
ity of opportunity-the right of every man to make his own deci-
sions and to go as far as his talents will take him-has been the 
dominant concern of our time. It has also been the primary con-
cern of the Warren Court. These values cannot be left behind when 
the Court proceeds from a civil rights or criminal case to an anti-
trust case. On the other hand, such values cannot simply be trans-
posed from controversies pitting blacks against whites to those 
between "big" business and "small" business; obviously the values 
may be qualitatively different and more important in one setting 
than in the other. Moreover, even in civil rights some have argued 
that the Court has gone too far-that it has created more than 
equality between black and white, poor and rich, and that it 
has failed to give proper weight to other societal values. This 
does not mean that equality as a social and political value is un-
important. It merely suggests that in a given case its cost may 
come too high. 
The question of cost-of the proper weighing of competing 
values-is now the critical one for antitrust. The teachings of 
economic theory may not be determinative of the outcome, but they 
are not irrelevant. Through the use of economic analysis, the 
costs of competing antitrust values can be identified ·with consid-
erable accuracy. If protection of independent judgment, indi-
vidual initiative, and equality of opportunity is achieved at the 
cost of economic efficiency, the price may be too great. Society 
may value small business, for example, but not to the point of 
subsidizing it. It is in the proper weighing of these values, it 
seems to me, that the Court has often failed. It has too often 
been intolerant of arguments predicated upon the efficiency-creat-
ing nature -of the conduct before it.45 While perhaps not all con-
duct resulting in economic efficiency should be approved, the Court 
must accurately appraise the cost of prohibiting a practice before 
condemning it. 
45. The clearest eicample is Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 
~;962). 
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Apart from what the Court has said and done in specific cases, 
what has. been the practical effect of its antitrust work? To a 
considerable degree, the answer must await the passage of time. 
It is surely too early to determine whether there has been any 
restructuring of American industry in a manner more likely to 
assure competitive results. We might assume, for example, that 
horizontal mergers have been significantly impeded and still con-
clude that alternative means of expansion have brought about 
just as much, if not more, concentration in the market. But some 
noneconomic effects are already apparent, and worth noting. 
First, both directly and through its encouragement of public 
and private enforcement, the Court has made the business com-
munity more aware of antitrust than ever before. No major Ameri-
can corporation would consider a merger today without first con-
sulting antitrust counsel. Businessmen now commonly talk about 
antitrust; internal compliance programs have been initiated and 
carried out. One cynical friend suggests that antitrust is now the 
second most talked about subject among businessmen, the favorite 
still being prices! 
Second, the broad prohibitory rules established by the Court, 
particularly in merger cases, have gradually but perceptibly worked 
significant institutional changes in the Antitrust Division of the 
Department of Justice. Prosecutors always have some degree of 
discretion in deciding whether to prosecute. But under the stan-
:lards of recent horizontal merger cases, the decision by the De-
-:>artment to proceed in a given case· is viewed as virtually deter-
"Dinative of the outcome. As a result~ attention has focused on this 
nitial decision. Formally or informally, hearing procedures are 
developing; argument li>y counsel may be heard before a complaint 
· s issued. Recent months have also seen the announcement of De-
;Jartment guidelines for enforcement of section 7 of the Clayton 
.Act.46 ·what all this suggests is that the decision-making forum is 
:hifting and that the Department is acting increasingly like an 
.:-dministrative agency-a development which warrants more at-
,:ention than it has so far received. 
Finally, the Court's work has resulted in an increasing cyni-
dsm about its methods and results ·which threatens to foreclose 
-:-ealistic assessment of its accomplishments and ultimately to jeop-
ardize acceptance of its commands. This is admittedly a harsh 
,,tatement. Hopefully I oYerstate the problem. I would be delighted 
to be wrnng. But anyone dealing daily with antitrust knows that 
a growing attitude exists among antitrust lawyers that no purpose 
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is served either by analyzing opinions or by preparing factual 
records and arguments. There is, in -short, a far too common belief 
that whatever the language of previous Court opinions, the find-
ings of the district court, or the merits of the case in general, the 
result is preordained. Defense lawyers expect to lose, and are likely 
to view the litigation as a useless gesture. I have heard govern-
ment lawyers express similar views, except that they expect to 
win. Combatting this same attitude in law students is, in my judg-
ment, the most difficult part of teaching antitrust. As an immediate 
matter, the effectiveness of the litigation process may be impaired. 
Such an attitude may also lead to an increasing assumption of 
decision-making responsibility by the Congress, thereby further 
impairing the credibility of the judicial process.47 
The attitude with which I am concerned is something more 
than fundamental disagreement with the results reached by the 
Court; there is obviously a difference between good faith criticism 
and cynicism. The cynicism of which I speak concerns the Court's 
methods-the decision-making process itself. This is not to suggest 
that it is an attitude wholly unconcerned with the result of cases, 
or that, indeed, it does not reflect some good faith disagreement 
with the policies being applied. But for the most part, cynicism has 
developed because of the one-sidedness of the decisions, not because 
of their merits. 
The tendency of many critics to focus on the manner in which 
the Court has decided cases, rather than upon the ultimate merits 
or the decisions, seemed deplorable to me when I began teacaing 
antitrust three years ago. Obviously some opinions were less 
than clear and seemed lacking in candor. There were occasions 
when the Court ignored or abused precedent to reach a partic-
ular result. But the same was true in many earlier opinions, and 
there have often been sound reasons for these deficiencies. It was 
equally true that the Cou_rt had formulated broad prohibitory 
rules in cases where such rules were not necessary to the outcome. 
But in my view it seemed clear that the interests of antitrust pol-
icy could not always best be served by deciding particular cases 
on the narrowest possible grounds. Broader rules which are stated 
with some certainty afford needed guidance to the business com-
munity. I was even willing to concede that the Court was result-
oriented. After all, the antitrust laws virtually direct the Court 
to formulate economic policy; to suggest that a Court so charged 
by the statute was result-oriented was virtuaily a truism. If in a 
47. Cf. Bank Merger Act of 1966, 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (Supp. II, 1967). 
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particular case the result happened to favor the Government, it 
was simply because the Government's position was in accord with 
the policies being applied by the Court. I still have considerable 
faith in these answers, but every year they are less satisfying. I 
now find myself being infected with the same cynicism, hopefully 
to a lesser degree, that has infected my students. I do not think 
the explanation is as simple as contagion. Whatever the explana-
tion, it is disturbing that those of us who should know better are 
catching the disease. 
The explanation for this cynical attitude is complex. It begins 
with statistics. During the 1953 through 1967 terms, the Court 
wrote full opinions in forty-five antitrust cases in which the Gov-
ernment was plaintiff. Forty-two cases were decided in the Govern-
ment's favor. Of tw:enty-five cases decided with full opinion involv-
ing the Federal Trade Commission, twenty-three decisions have 
been in favor of the Commission. Private plaintiffs in treble dam-
age suits have not fared quite as well; they obtained favorable 
results in only twenty of thirty-one cases decided with full opinion 
during this same period.48 To be sure, there have been landmark 
decisions in favor of defendants. Tampa Electric,'-9 upholding a long-
term requirements contract, and Noerr/•0 virtually immunizing 
what may be loosely described as lobbying practices from the anti-
trust laws, may be cited as examples. But these decisions came in 
treble damage suits to which the Government was not a party. 
There have been but two major decisions in government cases fa-
vorable to defendants. One, the DuPont Cellophane case, 51 came 
early in the history of the Warren Court, and the other, White 
Motor,52 apparently has been superseded. 
Among many laym:!_n, and indeed many lawyers, the basic con-
cept of evenhanded justice has come to be reflected in the view 
that some kind of score-a measure of justice if you like~n be 
kept in won-lost columns. When the columns get too far out of 
balance in either direction, something is wrong. The columns in 
antitrust arc now hopelessly out of balance. But such a won-lost 
48. These figures are based upon those in Arnold, supra note 29, at 18, which cover 
the Court's 1953 through 1965 terms. To these I have added figures for the 1966 term, 
as set out in The Supreme Court, 1966 Term, 81 HARV. L. R.Ev. 69, 128-29 (1967), and 
figures for the 1967 term based on my own count. There may of course be disagree-
ment over who "won" a particular case. The Schwinn case, for example, is identified as 
a Government victory, a debatable conclusion. But such disagreements can extend to 
very few cases. 
49. Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961). 
50. Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 
(1961). 
51. United States v. E. I. duPont de·Nemou1o &: Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956). 
52. White Motor Co. v. United State$, !172 U.S. 253 (1963). 
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analysis has little utility, for it says nothing about why the im-
balance has occurred. The figures may whet one's curiosity-may 
even raise doubts-but doubts can be erased by adequate explana-
tion. Some explanation may be found in the high selectivity exer-
cised by the Solicitor General over cases carried by the Govern-
ment to the Supreme Court. But ultimately, explanation of the 
Court's actions must come from the Court itself. The observer who 
is dissatisfied with the Court's own explanations of its actions is left 
to speculate for himself; 
Others have catalogued in detail the deficiencies in many of 
_the Court's, opinions, and I do not intend to repeat that here.153 
The cases about to be discussed are simply illustrative; they are 
ones which have particularly troubled my students as well as my-
self. They do not typify all of the Court's antitrust opinions (for 
some have been outstanding), but they are illustrative in the sense 
that other cases could be substituted to make the same points. Nor, 
it should be understood, do I intend to be critical for the sake of 
criticism. But the reasons for a widely prevalent attitude must be 
understood if it is to be corrected. What follows is in a sense a 
plea for the Court to give its defenders more help than it has given 
them in the past. 
The Court's merger decisions have contributed disproportion-
ately to the growing concern ·with the Court's methodology. Brown 
Shoe was well received, primarily because of the moderate tenor of 
the opinion. And there was an appealing practical candor to the 
opinion in Philadelphia Bank (at least that portion of the opinion 
dealing with the merits of the section 7 violation). But subsequent 
decisions, particularly those in which market definition has been 
critical, have caused many to concur with Justice Stewart's observa-
tion that the only consistent pattern discernible in the Court's 
merger decisions is that "the Government always wins."54 This at-
titude rests in part on tlie -fact that the Government has always won, 
and in part on the Court's ability to place increasing emphasis on 
the preservation of small business and a wide range of buyer choice 
as the market shares in the cases before it have grown smaller. 
The Brown Shoe opinion itself has been a contributing factor 
to the growing sense of cynicism. For as the Court has moved 
closer to a per se prohibition of horizontal mergers, its apparent 
departure from the approach suggested in Brown Shoe has led some 
to conclude that the Court did not mean what it initially said. This 
53. See, e.g., Handler, The Supreme Court and the Antitrust Laws (From the Yiew-
point of the Critic), 34 A.B.A • .ANTITRUST L.J. 21 (1967). 
54. United States v. Von's Grocery, 384 U.S. 270, 301 (1966) (dissenting opinion). 
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is the kind of self-perpetuating suspicion which is easily carried 
over to other cases. It is not inconceivable that the Court has had 
a more severe prohibition in mind all along, or at least that it has 
concluded that the antimerger movement desired by Congress would 
be substantially impeded by a single pro-merger decision. If so, 
Brown Shoe may be explained as a tactical effort to achieve initial 
maximum acceptance. Any subsequent open announcement of a 
harsher rule would have been too much of a departure from Brown 
Shoe, particularly since the same message could be communicated 
on a case-by-case basis. Moreover, adopting a harsher rule might 
have placed undue pressure to prosecute on the Department of 
Justice. If the Court has reasoned in such a manner, one might 
simply suggest that the cost in terms of impairment of its credibility 
has been too great. But while some members of the Court may have 
had such a preconceived plan, the more plausible explanation is 
that the Court meant what it said in Brown Shoe and that its posi-
tion has changed, if at all, only as it gained experience with sub-
sequent cases. Indeed, I do not agree that there has been a sub-
stantial departure from Brown Shoe. 
The most common specific attack on the Court's methodology 
in merger cases has been directed at its definitions of markets. On 
the whole, given the complexity of market definition and the lack 
of adequate expert guidance furnished to the Court, it has handled 
the process as well as can be expected. But market definitions can 
be manipulated to reach a particular result. Each party in merger 
litigation has a tactical reason for preferring one market definition 
over another. The Court has persistently accepted the market defi-
nitions proposed by or favorable to the Government, often setting 
aside district court fin_pjngs to do so. In such circumstances, it 
takes only one or two cases in which the Court's reasoning is clearly 
inadequate to cast doubt on the entire definitional process. Alcoa-
Rome Cable55 is such a case. The Supreme Court, having concluded 
contrary to the findings of the district court that insulated alumi-
num conductor was in a market apart from its copper counterpart, 
went on to define the relevant market to include both bare and in-
sulated aluminum cable. The inclusion of these two products in a 
single market is particularly astonishing. ·while noting that both 
bare and insulated aluminum cable are used to carry electricity, 
the Court's primary justification for this curious result was that it 
was simply "a logical extension of the District Court's findings."56 
But it clearly is not. It hardly follows that because aluminum in-
55. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271 (1964). 
56. 377 U.S. at 277 n.4 (1964). 
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sulated conductor and copper insulated conductor do not compete 
that bare and insulated aluminum conductor do. With what ex-
planation is the reader left? 
The Court's treatment of precedent has often lacked candor and 
interjected confusion concerning the. meaning of its rulings. In 
Simpson v. Union Oil Co.,57 for instance, the Court held unlawful a 
series of consignment contracts pursuant to which Union Oil fixed 
the price to be charged by its dealer-consignees. The Court's 
opinion is clouded with unnecessary uncertainty: although proceed-
ing on the assumption that there was a valid consignment, the Court 
emphasized the "coercion" of dealers, and its constant use of quo-
tation marks around the word "agency" suggests that it doubted 
the good faith of the arrangement. Holding the arrangement un-
lawful seems to conflict with the old G.E. case,58 which permitted a 
manufacturer to control its consignees' prices. Simpson distinguished 
G.E. on the ground that a patented article was involved in the 
latter, 59 a distinction far too transparent. The rationale of G.E. in 
no way relied upon the presence of a patent. In asserting that it 
did, the Court quoted portions of the G.E. opinion dealing with a 
completely different issue-the right of a patent holder to set the 
price at which its manufacturing licensees sell (a fact pointed out 
by the dissent). 
Simpson, in turn, was treated in an almost inexplicable manner 
in Schwinn,60 as was the Court's earlier decision in White Motor.61 
At issue in Schwinn were (1) agreements preventing distributors 
from selling bicycles purchased from Schwinn to anyone other than 
retailers franchised by Schwinn; (2) agreements preventing fran-
chised retailers from selling bicycles purchased from Schwinn to 
nonfranchised retailers; (3) a series_ of similar restrictions, includ-
ing territorial restrictions, imposed on distributors who did not 
purchase but acted as Schwinn's agents or. consignees. Agreements 
confining resale by purchasing distributors to specific territories 
had been held unlawful by the district court, and no review of 
this holding was sought. Schwinn's restraints upon purchasing dis-
tributors and retailers were similar to those before the Court in 
White Motor. In that case, which came on motion for summary 
judgment, the Court refused to apply a per se rule to the re-
straints, explaining that it did "not know enough of the economic 
57. 377 U.S. 13 (1964). 
58. United States v. General Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926). 
59. 377 U.S. at 23. 
60. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967). 
61. White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963). 
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and business stuff out of which these arrangements emerge to be cer-
tain of their purpose and effect."62 Yet in Schwinn, the Court seemed 
to hold that all agreements placing customer or territorial limita-
tions upon purchasing retailers are per se violations of the Sherman 
Act. What then became of White Motor? White Motor was cited 
in support of the Court's per se rule. Perhaps by the time Schwinn 
was decided the Court did know more of the purpose and effect 
of such arrangements, but this ·was not demonstrated. The Court's 
holding rested on the common-law rule against restraints on alien• 
ation, a rule without necessary relationship to anticompetitive effect 
and as much available in White Motor as in Schwinn. Recognizing 
that this common-law rule afforded no basis for condemnation of 
Schwinn's contractual arrangements placing similar restraints on 
consignees or agents, the Court next concluded that these restraints 
were not only not per se violations, but were entirely lawful on 
the record before it. The Court's distinction between agency and 
sale brought Schwinn into apparent conflict with Simpson, where 
the Court seemed to say that the application of antitrust rules is 
in no way dependent upon such a distinction. To be sure, Simpson 
emphasized that dealers had been "coerced" into the consignment; 
such coercion was apparently lacking in Schwinn. The dealers in 
Simpson handled no competing products; Schwinn's dealers did 
sell other bicycles. And, Simpson involved price-fixing. But the Court 
in Schwinn made virtually no effort to distinguish Simpson. The 
result in Schwinn may well be sound, but the Court's own explana-
tion, together with its. treatment of White Motor and Simpson, puts 
the matter in doubt. 
Finally, note should be taken of a number of cases in which the 
Court has adopted sti:~ined statutory constructions thought justi-
fied by broad antitrust policy considerations. The constructions of 
the jurisdictional provisions of section 7 in Philadelphia Bank63 and 
the interpretation of the All ·writs Act64 in Dean Foods65 may be 
cited as examples. Most disturbing, however, has been the Court's 
holding that under section 5(b) of the Clayton Act the pendency of 
Federal Trade Commission proceedings will toll the statute of 
limitations on treble damage actions involving the same matter.66 
Dealing with statutory language which was on its face quite clearly 
62. 372 U.S. at 263 (1963). 
63. United States v. Philadelphia Natl. Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 335-4!} (1963). 
64. 28 U.S.C. § 165l(a) (1964). 
65. FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597 (1966). 
66. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co. v. Minnesota Mining and Mfg. Co., 381 U.S. 
311 .(1965). 
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inapplicable, the Court's only specific reference to the language was 
a statement that it ·"does not clearly encompass Commission pro-
ceedings."67 Such decisions, whether right or wrong in terms of anti-
trust policy, are particularly disturbing to lawyers who may feel 
1;1neasy in criticizing substantive decisions because they do not fully 
comprehend economic doctrine, but who regard statutory interpreta-
tion as their own domain. 
Alcoa-Rome Cable, Simpson, Schwinn, and the other cases just 
discussed are of course but single cases. Each decision may be ex• 
plained, and its inadequacies may be justified. But it is the impres-
sion and attitude derived from a series of such cases that is trouble-
some. Too often the burden of explanation has been left to those of 
us who woukl. defend the Court. The task grows increasingly 
difficult. 
The antitrust accomplishments of the Warren Court have been 
many. As in other substantive areas it has led, not followed. It has 
led reluctant lower courts and, on occasion, a reluctant Department 
of Justice. But methodology is an important aspect of leadership, 
even for those in positions of power. A leader with a just cause may 
fail not because his cause is unacceptable but because his methods 
are wrong. This is the dilemma the Court now faces. Faced with 
increasing cynicism and distrust among many of those it seeks to 
lead, there is at least some danger that it may become a Pied Pi per 
with an unheeded tune. 
67. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co. v. Minnesota Mining and Mfg. Co., 381 U.S. 
311, 321 (1965). See P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 42 n.97 (1967). 
